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Summary
While the study of the Holocaust and its historical lessons
has traditionally been considered in the Western world as one of
the most effective means of combating anti-Semitism, racism and
xenophobia, in post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe Holocaust-related
issues have been a major cause of anti-Semitic incidents and growing
animus against Jews. In these societies which are being forced
for the first time to confront the complicity of their own nationals
in the crimes of the Holocaust, practical issues such as the acknowledgement
of the crimes, commemoration of the victims, prosecution of the
perpetrators and documentation of the events are proving to be
a major source of tension and conflict between Jews and non-Jews.
The author presents numerous examples from eight different post-Soviet
and post-Communist societies to explain how this phenomenon has
developed over the past fifteen years and calls for greater scrutiny
and active steps to address this issue.
No discussion of contemporary European anti-Semitism can avoid dealing
with the Holocaust and its impact on Europe, from the bloody events
of the Shoa to its present-day influence on European attitudes, policies,
culture and relations with Israel and the Jewish people. The subject
is unavoidable, not only because of the enormous trauma wrought by
that watershed event in the annals of Jewish history and of mankind,
but also due to the interesting and surprising developments over
the course of the past half-century in how that event has been perceived
in Europe and throughout the world.
For the past fifty years, and with particular intensity during the
past three decades, the Jewish world has invested many millions of
dollars in Holocaust commemoration and education. 1 The
general assumption behind this enormous investment was that knowledge
and understanding of that unique catastrophe and its historical context
and lessons would constitute the best antidote possible to contemporary
anti-Semitism, increase ethnic and religious tolerance, and help
combat racism, xenophobia, and nationalist extremism.2 After
all, how could anyone but the most peripheral elements in society
even consider being anti-Semitic after the Shoa? In that respect,
the unwritten, never-fully-formulated and openly admitted goal, was
to turn the Holocaust into the universal paradigm for the violation
of human rights and the most-widely acknowledged symbol of man’s
inhumanity to his fellow man, and World War II into the classic conflict
between the forces of Good and Evil and thereby help ensure the security
and physical future of the Jewish people throughout the Diaspora
and in the State of Israel.
The extent to which this strategy has been successful, and that
the Holocaust has indeed been turned into the universal symbol of
barbaric cruelty par excellence and of unwarranted human suffering
and has thoroughly permeated the European mind-set, can be illustrated
by three random events which took place in three different European
countries in the course of several days during the second week of
October 2004. The first is an initiative by the local council of
the Scottish village of Dunscore, launched in early October 2004,
to honor a Christian missionary named Jane Haining who was born nearby
and in 1944 was murdered in the gas chambers of Auschwitz as “a
victim of the Holocaust.” The idea that those seeking to honor
a woman who devoted her life to influencing Jews to abandon their
faith want her recognized as “a victim of the Holocust,”3 clearly
underscores the special resonance attributed to those victimized
by the Nazis, and the pseudo-sanctification of those victims.
The second example relates to an honor bestowed by the Spanish government
upon a soldier named Angel Salamanca who was among the Spanish troops
sent by Franco to fight with the Nazis against the Soviet Union during
World War II. Salamanca was honored at the October 12 parade to mark
Spain’s annual celebration of its armed forces, a step which
aroused considerable controversy, and particularly angered leftist
politicians who rejected this gesture as an attempt to create a false
equivalency between those who fought against fascism and those who
fought alongside the Nazis. Spanish Defense Minister Jose Bono claimed,
however, that the initiation was motivated by a desire to achieve
reconciliation and that the parade sought to honor “all Spaniards
who fought for the principles they believed in.”4 This
attempt to grant recognition to all the Spaniards who fought in World
War II regardless of the side they took, clearly emphasizes the enormous
importance attached by Europeans to the events of World War II and
the desire to achieve moral legitimacy for all those who served in
that conflict.
The third incident took place on October 11, 2004 in France, where
Bruno Golnisch, who is regarded as the second-ranking leader of the
French extremist right-wing party, the National Front, expressed
doubts as to the existence of gas chambers and hinted that he believed
that the number of victims of the Shoa was less than the generally-assumed
figure (of six million).5 The ongoing efforts by
leaders of anti-Semitic elements such as the National Front to undermine
the credibility of the commonly-accepted narrative of the Holocaust
are at least in part a reflection of the growing awareness of the
importance of the Holocaust as a watershed event in European history
and the effect of this recognition on the attitude of Europeans and
others towards Jews and the State of Israel.
With the memory and awareness of the Holocaust an increasingly powerful
factor in contemporary European life, and with Holocaust education
increasingly regarded as a bulwark against anti-Semitism,6 it
is ironic that during the past fifteen years it has been Holocaust-
related issues, more than any others, which have been the major catalyst
for anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe.
Yet since this anti-Semitism, which has primarily focused on undermining
the credibility and authenticity of the Jewish Holocaust narrative,
has not resulted in widespread anti-Jewish violence, similar to the
attacks which reached such dangerous levels in Western Europe, it
has hereto attracted minimal attention. But the underlying motivation
for the animus against Jews and its impact on local societies throughout
Eastern Europe are definitely worthy of scrutiny since they pose
a serious potential danger, and already are having a negative impact
on Jewish life in these countries.
The best way to analyze this phenomenon is to examine the reactions
in various countries to four of the six specific Holocaust-related
issues, which have emerged as central questions in Eastern Europe
in the wake of the fall of Communism and the dismemberment of the
Soviet Union.(While the fifth, and especially the sixth, issue are
also relevant in this context, they are beyond the scope of this
article and will be dealt with in future research.) Those events
have produced the historical and political circumstances in which
the newly-independent and newly-democratic regimes of Eastern Europe
have been forced to confront their Holocaust pasts, which in most
cases included extensive complicity by the local population in the
murder of the Jews.7 Thus, whereas all questions
relating to the events of the Shoa were previously determined by
Communist ideology and interests,8 these questions
were re-opened in the late eighties and early nineties and for the
first time these countries could acknowledge the truth and act upon
it in a practical manner.
The specific Holocaust-related issues which had to be addressed
by these governments were the following:
1. acknowledgement of complicity by the local population in the
murder of the Jews and an apology for those crimes;
2. commemoration of the victims;
3. prosecution of the perpetrators;
4. documentation of the crimes;
5. introduction of Holocaust education into the curriculum and the preparation
of appropriate educational materials;
6. restitution of communal and individual property.
A. Acknowledgement of Holocaust Crimes
Invariably, the first step which had to be taken in the process
of facing the past, was an acknowledgement of the crimes of the Holocaust
and the participation of locals in the murder of the Jews. In many
instances such an apology was made in the framework of a visit by
the head of state to Israel, although there were also cases in which
the local parliament passed such a resolution. Thus, for example,
both Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius and President
Algirdas Brazauskas formally apologized for Holocaust crimes during
visits to Israel,9 as did Latvian President Guntis
Ulmanis,10 Croatian President Stjepan Mesic,11 and
Polish President Lech Walesa.12
While these acknowledgements of guilt and apologies were considered
in Jewish circles as a necessary first step toward reconciliation,
such statements were often distinctly unpopular and severely criticized
at home, where nationalist and other elements either denied the historical
facts or believed that reciprocal apologies for crimes by Jewish
Communists should have been made by Israeli leaders. Thus, for example,
both Slezevicius and Brazauskas were roundly criticized by a wide
spectrum of Lithuanian public opinion for their apologies,13 as
was Polish President Lech Walesa for asking for forgiveness from
the podium of the Israeli Knesset.14 In Hungary,
Prime Minister Gyula Horn was sued by the publisher of a local edition
of Mein Kampf, who argued that by apologizing for Hungarian Holocaust
crimes, the premier had violated his personal rights by suggesting
that he was a member of a guilty nation.15
Particularly telling in this regard is the declaration condemning “the
annihilation of the Jewish people during the years of the Nazi occupation
in Lithuania” passed by the Lithuanian Supreme Council on May
8, 1990. Although the declaration specifically stated that it is
being issued “on behalf of the Lithuanian people,” it
attributes guilt for the crimes committed in Lithuania during the
Holocaust to “Lithuanian citizens,” a category clearly
not restricted to those of Lithuanian nationality, which could even
(by a twist of perverted logic) include Jews. Thus the Lithuanian
parliament seek to differentiate between the ostensibly blameless “Lithuanian
people” and the murderers who were “Lithuanian citizens,” a
distinction which is not supported by the historical record.16
B. Commemoration of the Victims
While this issue takes many different forms, the most important
in our opinion, is the decision to establish a special memorial day
for the victims of the Holocaust. In fact, the growing number of
countries which have taken this step, which originally was initiated
by the State of Israel, which for many years was the only country
to do so,17 is another powerful indicator of the
growing significance with which the Holocaust is regarded, especially
in Europe. In this context, however, one of the key issues is the
choice of the date for the memorial day, which often reflects local
attitudes toward dealing with the Holocaust. Thus, for example, twelve
countries, including Germany, have chosen January 27, the date of
the liberation of the Auschwitz concentration camp, rather than a
date linked to historic events in their own country, which could
probably have added significantly to the impact of local observance.
(Eleven countries have preferred to adopt a date linked to their
own history.)18
One of the latest countries to choose January 27 has been Estonia,
where the decision to observe a memorial day for the victims of the
Holocaust aroused considerable controversy and was singularly unpopular.
Thus, for example, typical of the local reactions to the decision
was the following question posed to an official of the Simon Wiesenthal
Center who had lobbied the government to choose a special day to
commemorate the Holocaust:
“You’re demanding that all the peoples of the world
including Estonia introduce the Jewish Holocaust memorial day. I’m
wondering when will the memorial day for [the] Estonian mass deportations
of 1941 and 1949 be introduced in Israel. Do you think that the war
sufferings of one nation should be put above others and the suffering
of other nations are nothing to speak of?”19
This sentiment was clearly expressed in a public opinion poll conducted
by the popular Estonian daily Eesti Paevaleht, which asked Estonians
whether they supported the establishment of a special memorial day
for the victims of the Holocaust. Ninety-three percent of the respondents
disapproved and only seven percent approved.20
Also of note is the choice of January 27, which has no ostensible
link whatsoever to the history of the Holocaust in Estonia. (No Estonian
Jews were deported to Auschwitz.) In fact, Estonian officials rejected
a suggestion by the Simon Wiesenthal Center that they choose either
January 20, the date of the infamous Wannsee Conference in 1942,
at which the implementation of the Final Solution was discussed and
Estonia was declared Judenrein (free of Jews), or August 7, the date
on which the 36th Estonian Security Battalion murdered Jews in Nowogrudok,
Belarus.21
Another Eastern European country which chose a date for its Holocaust
memorial day, which is of questionable value, is Lithuania. The date
chosen in Vilnius is September 23, which marks the day of the evacuation
of the Vilnius (Vilna) Ghetto,22 which was primarily
carried out by the Germans and was not accompanied by the mass murder
of the remaining Jewish inmates. More importantly, it is not linked
to the extensive mass murders carried out throughout the country
by Lithuanian vigilantes and security police during the initial half
year of the Nazi occupation. This (most probably intentional) decision
to divert the focus of the Lithuanian observances of Holocaust memorial
day facilitates the minimalization of Lithuanian participation in
the crimes of the Holocaust, a tendency clearly reflected in government
policy from the regaining of independence.23
C. Prosecution of Perpetrators / Nazi War Criminals
Of all the practical Holocaust–related issues which have faced
Eastern European governments in the aftermath of the fall of Communism,
this has undoubtedly been the most problematic and on which the least
has been achieved. Thus almost fifteen years after the breakup of
the Soviet Union and the return of democracy to Communist Eastern
Europe, a total of three Nazi war criminals -Lithuanian Security
Police commander Kazys Gimzauskas in Lithuania, Chelmno death camp
operative Henryk Mania in Poland and Jasenovac concentration camp
commander Dinko Sakic in Croatia - have been convicted, with only
the latter two actually having been punished for their crimes. These
figures, more than anything, reflect a distinct lack of political
will to deal with such cases, which have proven to be extremely unpopular
in these societies, and have aroused considerable anti-Semitic sentiment
which has been reflected in various ways.
Numerous examples can be adduced to illustrate the abysmal failure
to prosecute Holocaust perpetrators. In fact, with the exception
of Poland, there has not been a single country, which has initiated
an investigation of such a case upon its own initiative. To the extent
that any such cases were ever dealt with, it was invariably instances
in which the suspects were investigated and/or prosecuted elsewhere,
primarily in the United States, or were located by groups such as
the Simon Wiesenthal Center which lobbied for their investigation,
a demand usually supported by the United States and Israel. Even
worse, several of the countries, such as Lithuania, Latvia and Romania,
granted pardons to Holocaust perpetrators convicted by the Soviets
or Communists, even though individuals who had participated in genocide
were not eligible for such rehabilitations.24
This problem had been particularly acute in the former Soviet republics
of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia where local participation in the
crimes of the Holocaust was particularly extensive, and contributed
to the high rates of Jewish victimology in all three countries. Yet
despite the existence of numerous unprosecuted Nazi war criminals
in the Baltic countries, as well as others living overseas, practically
no concrete results have been achieved on this issue.25
This failure is most evident in Lithuania, which had the largest
by far pre-World War II Jewish community in the Baltics, and in which
over 210,000 Jews were murdered during the Holocaust, many by Lithuanians.
Among those actively involved in these crimes were twelve individuals
who had escaped to the United States shortly after World War II and
against whom the United States had taken legal action for concealing
their wartime activities, at least eleven of whom returned to Lithuania
once she obtained independence. Among the returnees were several
prominent figures in the World War II Lithuanian Security Police
(Saugumas), such as Vilnius district commander Aleksandras Lileikis
and his deputy Kazys Gimzauskas. Although both arrived in Vilnius
(Gimzauskas in 1993; Lileikis in June 1996) in relatively good health,
they were only indicted after they were no longer medically fit to
stand trial (Gimzauskas on November 20, 1997; Lileikis on February
6, 1998). Neither was forced to appear in court (Lileikis did so
voluntarily once for ten minutes on November 5, 1998 and briefly
followed one session by video hookup on June 23, 2000), nor were
they ever punished for their crimes. Liliekis died on September 26,
2000 before his trial was completed, whereas by the time Gimzauskas
was convicted on January 14, 2001, he was ruled unfit for punishment.
Neither sat even one minute in jail despite the important role they
played in the mass murder of the Jews of Vilnius.26
The cases of these Nazi war criminals served as focal points of
opposition by various segments of Lithuanian society to the prosecution
of local Nazi collaborators, and especially to the exposure of the
critical and extensive role played by Lithuanians in Holocaust crimes.
In fact, any initiative to bring Holocaust perpetrators to justice
in Lithuania, invariably led to a variety of negative reactions,
some of which included elements of violence. Thus, for example, in
response to the launching in Lithuania of the Simon Wiesenthal Center’s “Operation:
Last Chance” project, which offers financial rewards for information
which will facilitate the prosecution and punishment of Nazi war
criminals, a member of the Taurage city council burned an Israeli
flag in the center of town and drove around the town playing Nazi
marches on a loudspeaker.27
Additional efforts to facilitate the prosecution of local Nazi criminals
spawned numerous anti-Semitic reactions, particularly in local Internet
forums and especially on www.delfi.lt, and who knows how many instances
of vandalization of Jewish memorials and cemeteries.28 I
also believe that they had an important impact on the decision of
the Lithuanian government to seek the extradition from Israel of
two Lithuanian Jews alleged to have committed crimes against Lithuanians
in the service of the KGB.29 In fact, Israel refused
a Lithuanian request for judicial assistance in at least one of these
cases, on the grounds that since approximately two dozen Lithuanians
of equivalent or higher rank who served in the same unit as the suspect
were never investigated, let alone prosecuted, the decision to investigate
him stemmed from anti-Semitism and could therefore be legally rejected.30 This
fact was highlighted by nationalist elements whenever Jewish groups
lobbied for the prosecution of Lithuanians for Holocaust crimes.31
Another country which has done very little to prosecute its own
Nazi war criminals has been Estonia. The Estonian authorities have
hereto never initiated a single investigation of a local Holocaust
perpetrator and the case of an Estonian suspect who returned to the
country after being prosecuted in the United States, for example,
has dragged on with no results. In July 2002, the Wiesenthal Center
submitted the names of sixteen members of the 36th Estonian Police
Battalion, who were decorated in December 1942 for their service
with the Nazis, to the Estonian Security Police Board as possible
suspects in the murder of the Jews of Nowogrudok, Belarus on August
7, 1942, which was carried out by members of this unit (among others).
The Security Police Board announced approximately two weeks later
that there was no evidence to link the unit to the murder of the
Jews of Nowogrudok, despite the fact that its participation in this
crime was established by the Estonian International Commission for
the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity and confirmed by survivor
witnesses. The fact that the Estonian Security Police Board did not
even bother to mention their investigation of this case in responding
to the Wiesenthal Center annual questionnaire on Nazi war crimes
investigations is perhaps the best indication of the total lack of
political will in Tallinn to prosecute Holocaust perpetrators.32
The situation in this regard is even worse in countries like the
Ukraine, Romania, and Belarus, which since achieving independence
or returning to democracy have not initiated a single investigation,
let alone prosecution, of a local Nazi war criminal. Cases of crimes
committed by their nationals or on their territory which have been
prosecuted elsewhere, have never elicited any interest or response
by these countries.33
D. Documentation of Holocaust Crimes
The sins of omission and commission in this regard take various
forms, among them the relativization of Holocaust crimes, the attempts
to equate Communist crimes to those of the Shoa, the minimalization
of the participation of the local population in the mass murder of
the Jews, the exaggeration of the help provided to Jews by local
residents and last, but certainly not least, outright Holocaust denial
and even the attribution of Shoa crimes to the victims themselves.
One of the most prevalent tendencies in post-Communist Eastern Europe
has been the attempt to create a false symmetry between Nazi and
Communist crimes, and the erroneous classification of the latter
as genocide. This can clearly be seen, for example, in the Baltics
where all three post-Soviet republics established historical commissions
of inquiry to investigate the Nazi and Soviet occupations of their
country. Despite protests from various quarters,34 each
country insisted upon the establishment of a single commission to
investigate both the Nazi and Communist occupations, thereby strengthening
their contention of the equivalency of the tragedies.35
The theory of the “double genocide” or the symmetry
between Nazi and Communist crimes was particularly strong in Lithuania,
where it achieved prominence in the wake of the revelations by the
Simon Wiesenthal Center in 1991 that the Lithuanian government had
granted rehabilitations to numerous Lithuanian Nazi collaborators.36 Part
of the response to these accusations was to emphasize the role of
Jewish Communists in Soviet crimes committed in Lithuania as a counterbalance
and/or as justification for the participation of Lithuanians in Holocaust
crimes, a tendency which continues to remain strong in Lithuania.37 Along
the same lines, in the wake of the apology for the crimes of the
Shoa proffered by President Brazauskas in Israel, numerous Lithuanians
countered by pointing to Jewish participation in Communist crimes,
asking “Who will apologize to the Lithuanian nation?”38 Typical
of these comments was the article by popular writer Jonas Avzyius
who wrote that:
“His Excellency obediently apologized for Lithuanian criminals,
who murdered Jews during the Nazi occupation. But there was not the
slightest hint that the President of Israel should do something similar,
condemning his Jewish countrymen, who worked in repressive institutions
in Lithuania occupied by the Soviets and sent thousands of Lithuanians
to concentration camps.”39
Another example of the effort to present Communist crimes as the
equivalent of those of the Holocaust can be seen at the very highest
level in Latvia. Thus in January 2004, at a conference sponsored
by the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education
Remembrance and Research, Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga
emphasized two major points: that Communist crimes were just as terrible
as those of the Holocaust and that the measures taken by the Communists
in Latvia constituted genocide. Despite the relevance of the Holocaust
in this context, the Latvian president only mentioned it once in
passing, with nary a word about Latvian complicity in Shoa crimes.40 When
an official of the Simon Wiesenthal Center explained in an op-ed
that the president’s presentation did not reflect the historical
events accurately,41 there were calls for his murder,
as well as various anti-Semitic comments on a prominent Latvian news
website.42
Three additional tendencies prevalent in Eastern Europe, which reflect
the failure to confront the participation of local residents in the
crimes of the Holocaust are: the attribution of Holocaust crimes
entirely to German and Austrian Nazis (as opposed to locals); the
exaggeration of the number of, and scope of the assistance provided
by, local Righteous Gentiles, and the attempts to claim that the
only local participants in Holocaust crimes were criminals and/or
totally peripheral elements of society. Instances of each tendency
may be found in practically every post-Communist society. Thus, for
example, various Polish historians refused to accept the findings
regarding the responsibility of Poles for the murder of the Jews
of Jedwabne as described by historian Jan Gross in his book Neighbors.
In Lithuania, local officials opposed the inclusion of the phrase “and
their local accomplices” on a memorial monument at Ponar (Paneriai),
the site of the mass murder of the Jews of Vilnius, which attributed
the killings to the Nazis. The Hungarian government planned in 1998
to rebuild the Hungarian pavilion at Auschwitz in such a manner that
the blame for the annihilation of the Jews was almost exclusively
placed upon the Germans.43 In Estonia, the local
media invested much effort to disprove the findings of the international
commission of historians which established that the 36th battalion
of the Estonian Security Police actively participated in the murder
of the Jews of Nowogrudok, Belarus.44
In Lithuania, the number of Righteous Gentiles and the scope of
their assistance has been often exaggerated and presented as a counterbalance
to the deeds of the local perpetrators, to the extent that they are
acknowledged.45 The latter are often portrayed
as being on the fringe of Lithuanian society, such as in the speech
made by Lithuanian Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius at the dedication
of a memorial monument at Ponar where he referred to the killers
as “a group of criminals.”46 In Latvia,
the role of the Arajs Kommando has been emphasized to the virtual
exclusion of any other Latvians, despite the involvement of many
others in the killing of Jews.47 In Hungary, the
tendency has been to focus solely on the Arrow Cross, ignoring the
role played by the Hungarian gendarmerie and others throughout the
entire country, whereas in Romania the blame is often cast solely
upon the Iron Guard, despite the fact that the Romanian government
bears most of the responsibility for the murder of the Jews.48
Finally, there are the cases of outright Holocaust denial and those
in which the Jews themselves are blamed for the Holocaust. Thus,
for example, Slovak Deputy Minister of Culture Stanislavs Panis claimed
in 1992 that it was “technically impossible” for the
Nazis to murder six million Jews in camps and that Auschwitz was
an “invention” of the Jews to extort compensation from
Germany. Romanian presidential candidate Corneliu Vadim Tudor of
the Greater Romania Party (PRM) described the Holocaust in 1994 as “a
Zionist scheme aimed at squeezing out from Germany about 100 billion
Deutsch marks and to terrorize for more than 40 years, all those
who do not acquiesce to the Jewish yoke.” (He has since changed
his mind.) In Poland, neo-fascist political leader Boleslaw Tejkowski
claimed that the Shoa was actually a Jewish conspiracy to enable
Jews to hide their children in monasteries during World War II in
order for them to be baptized and thereby take over the church from
within. In fact, according to Tejkowski and the Romanian Radu Theodoru,
Pope John Paul II was actually a Jew.49
Perhaps the most fitting conclusion for an article on this topic
is to cite several examples in which the Jews themselves are blamed
for the Holocaust. Such arguments, as illogical as they are, have
appeared in several East European countries. Thus, for example, right-wing
elements in Slovakia claimed in 1997 that the Holocaust is the price
the Jews have to pay for crucifying Jesus. According to Hungarian
right-wing extremist Aron Monis, it was “Jewish world power” which
produced Hitler, who was actually a Zionist agent. In Romania, Theodoru
argued that Hitler had been a puppet in Jewish hands50 and
Prof. Ion Coja claimed that during the infamous Bucharest pogrom
of January 1941, Jews disguised as Iron Guard Legionnaires murdered
Romanians whom they dressed up as Jews.51 In Croatia,
President Franjo Tudjman wrote in his book The Wastelands of Historical
Reality that the number of Jewish victims of the Holocaust was grossly
exaggerated and that Jewish inmates ran the Jasenovac concentration
camp and controlled its liquidation apparatus. According to Tudjman, “The
Jew remains a Jew, even in the Jasenovac camp…Selfishness,
craftiness, unreliability, stinginess, deceit, are their main characteristics.”52
The material presented in this article is only a small sample of
the numerous cases in which attempts are being made throughout Eastern
Europe to distort and negate the history of the Holocaust. Although
it is true that some of the main culprits are minor figures or leaders
of peripheral political movements, others are even heads of state,
and clearly reflect (and influence) mainstream public opinion. In
this regard, it is important to heed the warning of American Jewish
historian Randolph Braham who survived the Holocaust in Hungary and
continues to follow the political developments in that country. In
his words:
“While the number of populist champions of anti-Semitism,
like that of the Hungarian neo-Nazis actually denying the Holocaust,
is relatively small, the camp of those distorting and denigrating
the catastrophe of the Jews is fairly large, and judging by recent
developments, growing. Wielding political power and influence, members
of this camp represent a potentially greater danger not only to the
integrity of the historical record of the Holocaust, but also, and
above all, to the newly established democratic system. For unlike
the Holocaust deniers – the fringe groups of “historical
charlatans”… the history cleansers who denigrate and
distort the Holocaust are often “respectable” public
figures – intellectuals, members of parliament, influential
governmental and party figures, and high-ranking army officers.”53
These developments, which have hereto attracted relatively little
attention, clearly constitute a potential danger, which should be
fully clarified and addressed before the negation of Jewish history
escalates into physical attacks on living Jews.
Notes
* This article is based on a lecture delivered at
a conference on “Anti-Semitism And The Contemporary Jewish
Condition,” sponsored by the Sigi Ziering Institute of the
University of Judaism, October 17-19, 2004.
1. During the past two decades alone, three multimillion-dollar
Holocaust museums, or museums with a major Holocaust component, have
been constructed: in Los Angeles (Simon Wiesenthal Center – 1993),
Washington (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum – 1993),
and New York City (Museum of Jewish Heritage - 1997), besides dozens
of smaller museums throughout the world. See, for example, Edward
Linenthal, Preserving Memory; the Struggle to Create America’s
Holocaust Museum, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995; James
E. Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning,
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.
2. One of the most important expressions of this
approach has been the activities of the Task Force for International
Cooperation on Holocaust Education Remembrance and Research (hereafter – TFICHERR)
established by Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson in 1998. See
his remarks in Stockholm meeting on the Holocaust; Summary from the
meeting of 7 May 1998 in Stockholm, Stockholm, n.d., pp. 4-9. For
a dissenting view on the effectiveness of Holocaust education in
combating anti-Semitism, see Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American
Life, Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1999, pp. 239-263.
3. John Innes, “Villagers plan to honor Scot
victim of Holocaust,” The Scotsman, October 14, 2004.
4. Renwick McLean, “Spain reopens old wound,” International
Herald Tribune, October 13, 1944, p. 1.
5. “Bachir ba-Yamin ha-tzorfati: Mutar Lehitvakeiach
al Mispar ha-Nispim ba-Shoa,” Ha-Aretz, October 13, 2004.
6. Whereas the TFICHERR was originally established
in 1998 by Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom, it presently
has eighteen members (fifteen from Europe), with at least four additional
European countries candidates for membership. See “Fact Sheet,” www.taskforce.ushmm.org
7. See, for example, Efraim Zuroff, “The Memory
of Murder and the Murder of Memory, in ”Emanuelis Zingeris(ed.)Atminties
Dienos; The Days of Memory), Vilnius: baltos lankos, 1993, (hereafter – Zuroff:
Memory) pp. 391-405.
8. Soviet memorials, for example, were notorious
for hiding the Jewish identity of the victims of Nazism who were
described as “Soviet citizens” or “victims of fascism,” while
the national identity of local participants was masked by references
to “bourgeois nationalists” or Hitlerite fascists.” See
ibid., p. 396 and William Korey, The Soviet Cage;Anti-Semitism in
Russia, New York: Viking Press, 1973, pp. 83-98.
9. Vygantas Vareikis, “Double Genocide and
the Holocaust Gulag: Rhetoric in Lithuania” (hereafter – Vareikis)
and Dov Levin “New Forms of Anti-Semitism in the New Established
Lithuania,” (hereafter – Levin) in “Jews and anti-Semitism
in the Public Discourse of the Post-Communist European Countries,” a
conference held on October 24-26, 2000, at the Vidal Sassoon International
Center for the Study of Anti-Semitism, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
10. Efraim Zuroff, “Latvia’s Holocaust
Role,” Jerusalem Post, February 18, 1998, p. 10.
11. Efraim Zuroff, “Visiting President Mesic
courageously tackles his country’s past,” Jerusalem Post,
October 31, 2001, p. 4. Marinko Culic, “Mesic’s Apology
to Jews,” November 5, 2001, www.aimpress.ch
12. Michael Shafir, Between Denial and “Comparative
Trivialization”; Holocaust Negationism in Post-Communist East
Central Europe (hereafter – Shafir), Analysis of Current Trends
in Antisemitism, No. 19, 2002, p. 28.
13. See note no. 9.
14. See note no. 12.
15. Ibid., p. 40.
16. “Declaration of the Supreme Council of
the Republic of Lithuania Concerning the Genocide of the Jewish Nation
in Lithuania During the Period of the Nazi Occupation,” May
8, 1990. For an analysis of the wording of the declaration see Zuroff:
Memory, pp. 397-398.
17. Michael Berenbaum, “On the Politics
of the Public Commemoration of the Holocaust,” Shoah, fall-winter
1982, pp. 6-37.
18. Amiram Barkat, “Many Western countries
also mark Holocaust day,” Ha-Aretz, April 19, 2004.
19. “Dr. Efraim Zuroff online: answers in
English,” Eesti Paevaleht, August 8, 2002, p. 6.
20. “Kas Eesti peab sisse holokausti paeva?
(Does Estonia need to impose a Holocaust memorial day?),” Eesti
Paevaleht, August 7, 2002; Internet Poll on Marking the Holocaust
Day, “Estonian Media Summary,” US Embassy, Tallinn, Estonia,
August 7, 2002.
21. Efraim Zuroff, “Holokausti Paev Eestis
oleks suur samm desi (Holocaust memorial day in Estonia would bea
big step forward), Eesti Paevaleht, August 7, 2002, p. 9.
22. See for example coverage of Holocaust remembrance
day 2001 in Lithuania, “Lithuanian Review,” September
24, 2004, p. 1; Rachel Eisenberg, “Rivlin marks 60th anniversary
of Vilna Ghetto’s destruction,” Jerusalem Post, September
24, 2003, p. 4.
23. Zuroff: Memory, pp. 391-405.
24. See Efraim Zuroff, “Worldwide Investigation
and Prosecution of Nazi War Criminals; An Annual Status Report” for
the period from January 1, 2001 until March 31, 2004, (3 reports)
published annually by the Simon Wiesenthal Center – Israel
Office.
25. Efraim Zuroff, “The Failure to Prosecute
Nazi War Criminals in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, 1991-1998,” Antisemitism
Research, Vol. II, No. 1, summer 1998, pp. 5-10.
26. See, for example, Michael MacQueen, “The
Office of Special Investigations and the Case of Aleksandras Lileikis,” a
lecture delivered at the “Holocaust in Lithuania in the Focus
of Modern History, Education, and Justice,” conference conducted
in Vilnius on September 23-25, 2002; Liudas Truska, “Contemporary
attitudes toward the Holocaust in Lithuania,” Jews in Eastern
Europe, 2 (45), fall 2001, p. 24; Efraim Zuroff, “Can Lithuania
Face Its Holocaust Past; Reflections of a Concerned Litvak,” Gachelet,
March 2002, pp. 75-76.
27. See for example “Laiko zenklai (Signs
of the times),” Lietuvos Rytas, June 21, 1996, p. 4; “E.
Zuroffas pasigenda normalaus naciu nusikalteliu teismo proceso (E.Zuroff
finds a lack of normal trials of Nazi criminals),” Baltic News
Service, July 13, 2002 and comments on www.delfi.lt ; Geoffrey Vasiliauskas, “No
one rules the world,” Laisvas Laikrastis, March 16, 2004 (hereafter – Vasiliauskas),
pp. 1-8.
28. “Taurageje surengta antisemitine akcija
(An anti-Semitic incident was organized in Taurage),”Lietuvos
Rytas, July 29,2002,p.2.”Lithuanian politician burns Israeli
flag, plays Nazi songs,” Agence France Press, June 29,2002.
Among the Jewish sites vandalized during the period since Lithuania obtained
its independence were several Holocaust memorial monuments, particularly in
smaller communities. See for example, “The Baltic States” in Dina
Porat(chief editor),Antisemitism Worldwide, 1994, Tel-Aviv: The World Jewish
Congress and the Anti-Defamation League, 1995, p. 129.
29. Mel Huang, “History Greets the New Year
on The Baltic,” Central Europe Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, January
10, 2000. The individuals in question are Nachman Dushanski and Semyon
Berkov.
30. Letter of Irit Kahan, Director of the Department
of International Affairs of the Israeli Ministry of Justice to Lithuanian
Prosecutor-General Kazys Pednycia, February 2, 2000, Archives of
the Israel Office of the Simon Wiesenthal Center (hereafter – SWCIA),
Lithuania, file no. 28.
31. Vasiliauskas relates that following a visit
to Lithuania by this author who had submitted particularly damning
testimony, obtained in the framework of “Operation: Last Chance,” (which
featured special ads calling upon individuals to volunteer information
regarding the identity of local Nazi perpetrators) regarding the
participation of Lithuanians in the murder of Jews in the town of
Rokiskis to the Lithuanian Special Prosecutor for genocide crimes,
the Lithuanian Center for the Study of Genocide and Resistance sponsored
special radio advertisements calling for people with information
on Communist crimes in the Rokiskis area during and after World War
II to come forward. Vasiliauskas, p. 4.
32. Efraim Zuroff, “Worldwide Investigation
and Prosecution of Nazi War Criminals: An Annual Status Report,” June
2003, pp. 30-31.
33. See note no. 24.
34. See for example, “Lithuanian State Head
Spurns Jewish Organization’s Rebuke,” Elta (Lithuanian
News Agency), November 20, 1998; “E. Zurofas nerimsta (E.Zuroff
is nervous),” Kauno Diena, November 20, 1998.
35. See for example the history of the Lithuanian “International
Commission For The Evaluation Of The Crimes Of The Nazi And Soviet
Occupation Regimes,” at www.komisija.lt.
36. Stephen Kinzer, “Lithuania Starts to
Wipe Out Convictions for War Crimes,” New York Times, September
5, 1991, p. 1.
37. Typical of the articles expressing this notion
was a piece by Valentinas Ardziunas in Lietuvos Aidas (March 14,
1995) which was accompanied by two illustrations: a monument to the
victims of the Holocaust in Alytus and a chapel built to commemorate
the murder of dozens of Lithuanians by the Communists at Rainiai
forest. Vareikis, pp. 4-6.
38. Ibid. pp. 6-8.
39. Jonas Avyzius, “Kam Prezidentas tikras
tevas? ((Who is the person whose real father is the President),” Respublika,
March 25, 1995, quoted in ibid., p. 8.
40. Address by H.E. Vaira Vike-Preiburga, President
of the Republic of Latvia at the International Forum Preventing Genocide:
Threats and Responsibilities, Stockholm, January 26, 2004.
41. Efraim Zuroff, “Misleading comparisons
of 20th century tragedies,” Baltic Times, February 19-25, 2004.
42. Among the comments on www.delfi.lv were the
following:
1. “To the wall [to be shot] this person and finish[him off].” (February
20, 2004, 9:31).
2. Zuroff thinks that the only nation which suffered in world history are the
zhids [derogatory
term for Jews – EZ], All the other people are their butchers…Jews
were always successful in
trade and usury.” (February 20, 2004, 9:33)
3. “It is written in the Bible that zhids are an experimental mistake.
G-d himself wanted to
annihilate them because the nation is wicked, without honor and virtue . All
their history is
war, killings, and treachery. We must state clearly: Zuroff and the zhid government
in Israel
are criminals.” (February 20, 2004, 16:27).
43. Michael Shafir cites these examples to describe
a phenomenon, which he calls “deflective negationism,” which
in this case relates to the attempts to attribute guilt for the crimes
of the Holocaust solely to the Nazis. Shafir, pp. 24-37. In the case
of the monument at Ponar, the term “and their helpers” appears
in the inscriptions in Yiddish and Hebrew but not in Lithuanian or
Russian, and the all-important adjective “local” does
not appear anywhere. Efraim Zuroff, “Can Lithuania face its
past?,” Jerusalem Report, August 1, 1991, p. 48.
44. The Estonian daily Eesti Paevaleht was so intent
on discrediting the findings of the international commission regarding
the participation of the Estonian 36th battalion in the murders at
Nowogrudok, that it featured an interview with Vassili Arula who
served in the unit and denied its involvement, but whose testimony
in this regard was of little relevance since he only joined the battalion
long after the murders had taken place. Toomas Kummel, “Ainus
elav tunnistaja kaitseb 36. eesti politseipataljoni (Only living
witness defends 36th Estonian Police Battalion),” Eesti Paevaleht,
August 5, 2001.
45. The most obvious reflection of the Lithuanians
eagerness to uncover Righteous Gentiles (as opposed to their reluctance
to prosecute Nazi war criminals) is the large discrepancy between
the numbers claimed by the Lithuanians (approximately 2,300 families
as of late 2000) and the far smaller figure officially recognized
by Yad Vashem, the Israel national remembrance authority (513 individuals).
Thus, for example, Knesset Speaker Reuven Rivlin on a visit to Lithuania
on Holocaust memorial day there, refused to participate in a ceremony
honoring thirty Lithuanians, whom Lithuanian sources claim helped
save Jews during the Holocaust, since only twelve of them had been
recognized by Yad Vashem. Rachel Eisenberg, “Rivlin marks 60th
anniversary of Vilna Ghetto’s destruction,” Jerusalem
Post, September 24, 2003, p. 4. For mention of the symmetry Lithuanians
seek to create between local perpetrators and rescuers see Jonas
Patrubavicius, “Blatant and latent asymmetry of Lithuanian
anti-Semitism,” Laisvas Laikvastis, April 13, 2004, p. 9. The
figure on the Righteous Gentiles recognized in Lithuania appears
in Solomonas Atamukas, “The Hard Long Road Toward The Truth:
On The Sixtieth Anniversary Of The Holocaust In Lithuania,” Lituanus
Volume 47, No. 4 – Winter 2001, p. 11. The figures for Yad
Vashem are correct as of January 1, 2004 and were supplied by that
institution. “Righteous Among the Nations – per Country & Ethic
Origin, January 1, 2004, Yad Vashem Department For the Righteous
Among The Nations.
46. “Address by Gediminas Vagnorius, Prime
Minister of the Republic of Lithuania on 20 June 1991 At Dedication
Ceremony Of The Memorial At Ponar,” SWCIA, Lithuanian criminals,
file no. 3.
47. Andrew Ezergailis, “Sonderkommando Arajs,” lecture
at 9th International conference on Baltic studies in Scandinavia,
June 3-4, 1987; idem., The Holocaust in Latvia 1941-1944, Riga and
Washington D.C.: The Historical Institute of Latvia in association
with The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 1996.
48. Shafir describes this phenomenon as another
example of “deflective negationism,” with the primary
guilt being attributed to fringe elements. Shapir, p. 37.
49. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
50. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
51. Prof. Coja wrote an article with this spurious
accusation as recently as January 2004 after his political patron
Tudor had already apologized for his previous Holocaust denial and
anti-Semitic comments. Ion Coja, “De ce n-au luat romanii Premiul
Nobel pentru Pace in 1994 (Why the Romanians did not win the Nobel
Prize in 1994),” Romania Mare, January 21, 2004.
52. Thomas O’Dwyer, “Where’s
the Croat Havel?” Jerusalem Post, August 7, 1997; “Nazi-hunter
slams Croatian links,” Jewish Chronicle, September 12, 1997.
53. Quoted in Shafir, p. 11.
Efraim Zuroff is director of the Israel office of the Simon Wiesenthal
Center and coordinator of Nazi war crimes research for the Center worldwide.
He is the author of Occupation: Nazi-Hunter: the Continuing Search
for the Perpetrators of the Holocaust (1994), and has written extensively
about the efforts to bring Holocaust perpetrators to justice the world
over. His most recent book is The Response of Orthodox Jewry in the
United States to the Holocaust: the Activities of the Vaad ha-Hatzala
Rescue Committee 1939-1945 (2000). Since 2001, he has published the
Wiesenthal Center’s Annual Status Report on the Worldwide Investigation
and Prosecution of Nazi War Criminals.
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